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 Abstract 
A new specification is employed to test for the degree of endogeneity of commercial bank credit, 
and its response to structural variables relevant to the Indian context. Our specification allows us to 
both identify money supply in a single equation, and disentangle the contribution of the Central and 
the Commercial Banks to the money supply process. Bank credit reacted more to financial variables 
and had dissimilar responses to food and manufacturing prices and output. Instead of interest rates, 
sectoral returns played a major role. Monetary policy broadly succeeded in preventing an explosive 
growth in money supply and reined in inflationary expectations. But by targeting manufacturing 
prices it harmed real output. The estimated structure implies that it would be more efficient to target 
agricultural prices for inflation control. A monetary contraction should be completed earlier than in 
the past, and should coincide with a rise in food prices. Information available in the systematic 
structural features can be exploited in designing monetary policy. 
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The Money Supply Process in India: Identification, Analysis and Estimation 
 
 
1.Introduction 
We employ a new specification to examine the degree of endogeneity of commercial bank credit, 
and its response to structural variables unique to the Indian context. Our specification allows us to 
both identify money supply in a single equation, and disentangle the contribution of the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) and the Commercial Banks to the money supply process. Features of the Indian 
financial sector help in the design of the test and demonstrate the impact of structure on the money 
supply process. Prior to the nineties high powered money was endogenized through the automatic 
financing of the Government deficit. But monetary control was sought to be imposed by a direct 
regulation of credit generation by banks, combined with measures such as a cut in public investment 
to reduce demand. Did this succeed? Did banks fulfil profit motives and endogenize credit even 
when it conflicted with central banks objectives? To what extent were they able to expand credit to 
meet demand? What was the degree of control the RBI was able to impose? How have structural 
variables influenced the process?   
 With financial reforms, banks have greater freedom; capital inflows make it more difficult to 
control high powered money; and money demand will become unstable as close financial substitutes 
develop. But if deep structural aspects of bank behavior are successfully modelled it can aid in the 
design of policy even in the new era. Although loans create deposits, loans are determined both by 
supply and demand. They depend on profit maximization by banks; and on RBI monetary policy 
that changes base money. It is a common perception that macroeconomists either believe money 
supply to be endogenous, or believe it can be controlled. But the facts seem to lie somewhere 
between these positions. We discover that although the RBI has been able to affect the base money, 
banks have been able to circumvent controls and expand credit when there were profits to be made. 
 In Post Keynesian monetary theories credit is created only in response to demand, and 
financial institutions adapt according to the profit motive to create it when required. Palley (1994) 
shows how banks, by altering incentives facing depositors, can expand broad money on an 
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unchanged base. Changes in bank assets imply a change in broad money supply. Foster (1992) in an 
approach that emphasizes structure derives and estimates a stable aggregate money supply function. 
The latter captures the persistent tendencies, resulting from a historical process, in which banks 
adapt according to their evolutionary advantage. His final equation is similar to ours. A structural 
variable, real estate prices, enters the supply function he estimates. A standard money supply 
function does not include such a variable. 
 The model and empirical tests are derived from basic monetary theory in Section 2. Our 
parsimonious specification aims to achieve a purposive simplification. It gives information on both 
the endogeneity of bank credit and the role of structural features. It does so in a single equation 
format that manages to avoid identification problems. The model is estimated with OLS for yearly 
and quarterly data. Time series ARIMA modelling is also used. This allows us to distinguish 
between short- and long-run effects. A cointegrating vector and long-run regression are obtained. 
The results are discussed in Section 3. Details are in the Appendix. Section 4 concludes.     
   
2. Designing the Tests 
2.1 The Simultaneity Bias 
Consider a simple stylized downward sloping money demand and upward sloping money supply as 
a function of the nominal rate of interest. For identification to be possible there must exist  a variable 
that shifts one of the functions but leaves the other unchanged. The shifting function will then 
identify the other. There must exist a subset of variables that change money supply while leaving 
money demand unchanged, or vice versa. Otherwise only a scatter of market equilibrium points will 
be estimated. 
 But such a subset of variables does not exist. If money supply is endogenous, variables 
affecting money demand also affect supply. It is necessary to estimate a simultaneous equation 
system, with money demand, supply and the market equilibrium condition. In an imperfectly 
identified single equation the independent variables would be correlated with the error term so that 
the parameter estimates would be inconsistent. In addition, diagnostic tests are often invalid after the 
specification searches that accompany most econometric work. Cooley and LeRoy (1981) point out 
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that in estimates of money demand most researchers reproduce signs of coefficients according to 
their prior beliefs, partly because they stop searching after "satisfactory results" are obtained. Sims 
(1980) argued that invalid "incredible identifying restrictions" were often used in macroeconomic 
modelling. Once disequilibrium is considered supply is not determined by "nature" or technology 
through maximization by agents facing given prices. Supply would not then be independent of 
demand. If rational expectations are formed over a model, variables affecting demand would 
influence supply decisions. From a systemic perspective all variables must enter each function. In 
modern empirical work (Bordo and Jonung 1987) stochastic trends affect both money demand and 
supply elements. There is no variable that can be excluded from money demand or supply, to 
identify the other. 
 
2.2 Earlier Empirical Studies  
Have these issues been tackled in the numerous Indian empirical studies of money? The studies can 
be divided into: (i) subsets of macroeconometric models, and (ii) single equation estimations of 
either money demand or the money multiplier. We concentrate on the modelling of money supply. 
The first set of models can be sub-classified as Keynesian-Structuralist or Monetarist1. In the former, 
prices are determined from the cost side, and the monetary sector is somewhat sketchy. Base money 
is endogenized through automatic financing of the budget deficit. Nominal interest rates were rigid 
before the reform of the nineties; therefore credit rationing is sometimes invoked to model periods of 
tight monetary policy. In Monetarist models money determines prices through the quantity of 
money; the implication is that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) can control the latter. Structural 
variables such as agricultural output and price, asset prices such as gold, real estate and share prices 
are neglected, but these may influence the speculative demand for money and the incentives of 
banks to create credit. Jadhav (1990) provides a survey, and points out that shortcomings continue. 
A satisfactory combination of key monetary and structural features is still lacking.  
  Single equation forecasting exercises (for example, Rao, Venkatachalam and Vasudevan 
1981) that became popular in the eighties sought to go beyond the balance sheet approach for 
determining the components of money supply. The latter was the Reserve Bank (RBI) approach in 
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the seventies in which the money multiplier was assumed to be constant even in incremental terms.  
 In the mid-seventies, a fruitful debate centering on the money multiplier improved the 
analytical understanding of money supply determination. Protagonists of the money multiplier 
approach, such as Gupta (1976) challenged the RBI viewpoint that the multiplier had little bearing 
on the operational aspects of monetary policy. This led to a resurgence of interest in the money 
multiplier  on the part of the RBI, as evidenced by important RBI studies (Singh et. al. 1982, 
Rangarajan and Singh, 1984). As many of these studies are based on a subset of equations rather 
than a fully specified macromodel they are examined below.   
 This set largely ignores simultaneous equation bias and identification problems. Chitre in his 
(1986) study of the money multiplier, modelled demand and supply for money as equated through 
the call money rate, and the general level of prices. Quarterly real income and the interest rate on 
fixed deposits were exogenous. The elasticity of the currency to deposit (C\D) and the reserve to 
deposit (R\D) ratios, the call rate and anticipated inflation are all subject to simultaneity bias. But 
these elasticities, and therefore, the bias in the elasticity of the reserve multiplier were expected to be 
small. Chitre ran regressions for each component of the money multiplier. 
 Nachane and Ray (1989) used time series analysis to improve the forecasts of the money 
multiplier. They believed this to be an advance over Chitre's method since it allows an endogenous 
specification of lags. Even so, they admit that the techniques they use cannot simultaneously take 
care of lags and feedback; they ignore the latter.  
 Following these seminal studies, a number of authors sought to obtain more accurate 
predictions of the money multiplier. These were an important policy input. To target the money 
stock from a given base or high-powered money, it was necessary to predict the money multiplier, so 
that the bank's contribution to raising money supply could be quantified. The consensus was that the 
money supply function is stable.  
 Monetary control also requires stability of money demand; the Reserve Bank view2 is that 
this is satisfied, although the income elasticity of demand for money has been rising. Rao and Singh 
(1995) argue that in spite of the overwhelming international evidence on instability of money 
demand, money, income and a relevant interest rate are cointegrated, demonstrating long-run 
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stability. Even so, their view is that targeting of nominal income, or velocity, is superior to targeting 
some monetary aggregate, since velocity can be derived independently or residually, without trying 
to invert a questionable money demand schedule.  
 Existing studies have not adequately analyzed the interactions between the players who 
determine money supply. But changes ushered in by the financial reforms have turned attention 
towards this structure. If banks managed some autonomy to maximize profits even in a regime of 
direct credit controls, then these motives will dominate in a liberalized era. Answers to the questions 
we pose will be both informative and important. 
    
2.3 The Model 
Money supply is a multiple of reserve money. The expansion depends on the money multiplier. The 
money multiplier in turn is a function of C\D, and R\D. Households' choice of C\D would depend on 
income, the rate of interest on time deposits, anticipated inflation and other seasonal and lagged 
variables. Banks' choice of R\D is compounded of required reserves and excess or borrowed 
reserves. The former are statutorily determined and have been used by the RBI to offset changes in 
base money, H. Prior to the reforms, monetary tightening was achieved by cutbacks in government 
capital expenditure, and by draconian use of SLR (statutory liquidity ratio) and CRR (compulsory 
reserve requirements).    
 Bank's decision to hold excess reserves depends upon output as reflecting the demand for 
credit, the call money rate as reflecting the cost of borrowing reserves, and other interest rates as 
reflecting the opportunity cost of holding reserves or the incentive to lend. As nominal interest rates 
were rigid, changes in asset prices and inflation rates reflected these opportunity costs. The call 
money rate was fixed at a ceiling of 15 percent in December 1973, and was constant at 10 percent 
from April 1980 until it was relaxed in the nineties. Banks did, however, develop methods such as 
buy-back arrangements in Government securities. These carried much higher effective interest rates 
and allowed them to breach the ceiling, especially in periods of tight liquidity (RBI, 1987). Even in 
countries where interest rates are variable, collinearity among the different interest rates poses a 
major problem in estimation. Income and interest rates are the variables determining the demand for 
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money also.  
 We propose to sidestep the identification problem by estimating M3-H (broad money with 
high powered money subtracted from it), as a function of a range of output, price and interest rate 
variables. As this is not the money balance, the resulting regression cannot be a demand for money 
equation. It has an advantage over the components regression approach to estimating the money 
multiplier, because it gives the aggregate response of credit to structural price variables that function 
as proxies for interest rates, and reflect deeper determinants of variables commonly used in 
component regressions for the money multiplier. The approach is in line with modern indirect 
methods of inference as used for example in the New Empirical Industrial Organization. The idea is 
to obtain information about unknown economic variables from observed outcomes. Abstracting 
from shocks to H allows us to concentrate on adaptations in inside money or credit.  
  If the components of M3 and of H are substituted, it turns out that M3-H is bank deposits 
minus reserves. If reserves could be neglected, and if deposits and currency are perfect 
complements, or the currency ratio is fixed, it could be estimating money demand. But the degree of 
substitutability between currency and deposits is high and variable in a developing country because 
of a varying speed of monetization, financial intermediation and the presence of black money.  
Moreover, Granger causality tests (reported in the Appendix) validate the absence of simultaneity 
bias; M3-H is caused by the variables we have selected; reverse causality is largely absent; the 
pattern of coefficients suggests that it is money supply and not demand that is identified.  
 Again, if reserve requirements are exogenous, our equation could be estimating the demand 
for deposits, with reserves added to M3-H like an error in the measurement of the dependent 
variable. Coefficients can be consistently estimated with a random error in the dependent variable. 
But in India there have been frequent changes in reserve requirements. They have functioned as the 
main instrument of monetary control, and therefore are systematically linked to the endogenous 
variables. The average CRR rose from 9 per cent in 1984 to 15 per cent by 1989, the SLR was nearly 
40 per cent. Therefore the estimated equation cannot be interpreted as measuring demand for 
deposits. 
Bank credit responds to our explanatory variables, but it is total money supply that determines them. 
This imposes some restrictions on the structure of variances and covariances so that the explanatory 
variables can be taken as exogenous in the determination of bank credit. In addition to the causality 
results, therefore, theory suggests that our single equation estimator will be efficient, given Indian 
monetary intervention. To see this consider the following simplified model of bank credit supply and 
money demand: 
  tttt vrhm +=− β                (1) 
The supply function can also be written as: 
  tttt hvrm ++= β                (2) 
The money demand is: 
  ttt urm +=α                 (3) 
mt, rt and ht are deviations from their respective means, where M is a measure of broad money, R a 
generic price variable entering demand and supply and H the monetary base. Let 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) vhttuhttuvtthtvtut hvhuvuhvu σσσσσσ ====== cov,cov,cov,var,var,var 222 . We are 
interested in estimating ß without bias. Since 
  
( ) ( )
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∑
∑
∑ ++==∧ 22 /1
/1
t
ttt
t
tt
rT
hvrT
r
mr ββ             (4) 
It follows 
  
( ) ( )[ ][ ]∑∑
++=∧ 2/1lim
/1lim
lim
t
ttt
rTp
hvrTp
p ββ             (5) 
Since 
  ttttt urhvr +=++ αβ               (6) 
  αβ −
−−= ttt hvur                (7) 
It follows 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+−=+=+∑ vhhvuhuvtttttt hvrhvrTp σσσσσαβ 21cov/1lim 22       (8) 
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and 
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( )uvuhvhvhvtt rrTp σσσσσσαβ 2221)var(/1lim 22222 −−+++−==∑         (9) 
Therefore 
 ( ) ( )( )uvuhvhvhv vhhvuhuvp σσσσσσ
σσσσσαβββ
222
2
lim 222
22
−−+++
−−−+−+=∧         (10) 
ß is expected to be positive and α negative. Therefore the sign of the bias depends on the 
relationship between the variances and covariances. From the institutional structure of the Indian 
monetary sector, we can take cov (utvt) = σuv to be zero, cov (utht) = σuh to be small and positive 
because of the limited accommodation of shocks to money demand. But cov (vtht) = σvh will be large 
and negative, because of the monetary control policies adopted in India, where excessive rise in 
money supply was neutralized by a rise in statutory reserve requirements. With such a configuration 
of signs the bias will approach zero and the estimate of ß obtained will be consistent. The 
relationship between the variance covariances allows consistent estimation.   
 
3. The Model and the Results 
The variables gross domestic product in agriculture (GDPA), gross domestic product in non-
agriculture3 (GDPNA), wholesale price index for food (WPIF), wholesale price index for 
manufacturing (WPIM), the ratio of WPIF to WPIM (RFMWPI), call money rate (CMR), and the 
Bombay stock exchange index (BSEI), were regressed on M3-H as the dependent variable. A double 
log formulation was used. The first set of regressions (I) were with yearly data for the period 1960-
61 through 1991-92, giving 32 observations. BSEI was not included in this set as data on this 
variable were available only after 1980-81. The second set of regressions (II) used quarterly data 
over the period 1980-81 to 1992-93. To get around collinearity problems between the different price 
series, the quarterly regression (II) was run with BSEI and RFMWPI as the price variables. The 
number of observations were 52. With the quarterly data set binary correlations were obtained 
between the innovations in M3-H and each of the other variables. The cointegrating vector and long-
run regression were estimated. The variables were kept in level form, as the latter procedures correct 
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for unit roots and time series structure. 
 If the equations estimate the behavioral response of banks, what are the expected values of 
the coefficients? The coefficient on CMR should be negative and that on income variables positive. 
A negative coefficient for CMR would also imply stability of the money market. The control of 
inflation has been a major objective of monetary policy. Before the nineties, Government 
expenditure had been cut in inflationary periods to reduce monetization of the deficit, and other 
direct measures taken restrict credit. If the Reserve Bank has been able to control credit expansion of 
banks, the coefficients on the price variables should be negative at least over the medium-run. But if 
credit responds to a demand led rise in profitability, the coefficients of the price variables would be 
positive. With rigid nominal interest rates, a rise in price would imply lower real interest rates that 
could stimulate investment or speculative demand. If such an effect is not observed, implicit interest 
rates, that take account of costs of credit rationing, must be rising in periods of inflation. Strongly 
positive coefficients on BSEI, gold or food grain prices indicate accommodation of demand for 
speculative credit. Price bubbles on these assets are sustained for some time, therefore banks make 
extra normal profits because of higher charges on and turnover of such loans. If structuralist-sectoral 
considerations are unimportant, the coefficients on agricultural and non-agricultural prices and 
outputs would be similar; otherwise sectoral relative prices and returns, normally neglected, should 
enter the money supply decision. If the equation is estimating demand for money the coefficient on 
BSEI would be negative; rising stock prices raise the opportunity cost of holding money. 
 
 PLACE TABLE 1 HERE  
  
 The results are presented in Tables 1-3. Table 2 reports the quantitative regression results. 
The regressions are corrected for serial correlations in the residuals. Table 1 gives the signs of the 
coefficients, for the yearly (I) and quarterly (II) regressions, and the contemporaneous correlations 
between innovations in the ARIMA residuals of M3-H (the details of computation are in the 
Appendix), with the similar innovations for each of the explanatory variables used. This is also the 
column 0 in Table 3.  
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 PLACE TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 Table 3 gives the lagged innovations in the ARIMA residuals of M3-H with innovations in 
time zero for the ARIMA residuals of each of the other variables. These are bivariate correlations, 
but the results give additional information on the temporal structure of the monetary adjustment. The 
significance tests for the correlation coefficients are reported in brackets. With the number of 
degrees of freedom we have, any coefficient greater than 0.2 works out to be significant. Each 
variable has at least one significant correlation coefficient. As the correlations are calculated 
between the innovations in the ARIMA residuals for each series, they are not spurious correlations 
arising from trending time series. They are useful for understanding the relationships between the 
variables. The regression results in turn demonstrate that the correlations are not purely bivariate 
phenomena. They reflect aspects of the money supply process. Price series that included 
intermediate goods were also tried in lieu of WPIM and gave similar results.   
   
 PLACE TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 A cointegrating vector was obtained between the I(1) variables d(M3-H), GDPNA, WPIF, 
WPIM and BSEI, where d is the difference operator. The cointegrating regression reported below 
gives evidence of a long-run relationship between the variables, and the other regressions and 
correlations fill up the picture of the relationships in the shorter periods. All of these results together 
give a well rounded interpretation of the money supply process in India. The number of observations 
was not sufficient to estimate an ECM relationship between all the variables. The coefficients of the 
equation given below are the cointegrating vector. Each of the coefficients were found to be 
significant (see the Appendix). 
 
D(M3-H) = -10.324 WPIF - 53.44 WPIM + 0.1009 GDPNA - 1.0007 BSEI 
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The adjustment coefficient vector alpha' is: 
alpha' = ( 3.0181, -0.0027, -0.00008, 0.9042, -0.115 ) 
 We can interpret the adjustment coefficients as the speed of adjustment towards the 
estimated equilibrium state, such that a low co-efficient indicates slow adjustment and a high co-
efficient indicates rapid adjustment. 
 The use of the structural variables gives very interesting insights, on the process of monetary 
adjustment in India. It turns out that bank credit responds more to price as compared to output 
variables; there is some flexibility in response to demand and profit opportunities available to banks. 
 The returns to an asset rise with its price3 and provide a capital appreciation component that 
can stimulate a speculative bubble. In efficient capital markets bubbles should not arise, but real 
world capital markets, especially in developing countries, are not perfectly arbitraged or efficient. 
Therefore creditors have an incentive to feed a bubble. Such bubbles can explain the positive 
coefficients for WPIF, CMR and BSEI in Table 1. The coefficient for BSEI is high and significant in 
the quarterly regression (II). The coefficient of gold price was also positive in the yearly regression 
but was insignificant and therefore was dropped subsequently. Credit responds to demand created by 
these bubbles in asset prices.  
 Price variables also capture generalized inflation that with fixed nominal interest rates would 
reduce real interest rates and raise the demand for credit as physical investment rose. But the 
empirical results imply that bank credit is less accommodating in response to a rise in 
nonagricultural prices. The coefficient of WPIM is negative in the yearly regression; the correlation 
coefficient for WPIM is negative in the first quarter; summing up over all quarters it is lower than 
that for WPIF. Implicit interest rates facing industry rise in periods of tight liquidity. Banks have an 
incentive to expand credit in periods of rising WPIM. Their real cost of borrowing falls if the 
nominal CMR is held at its ceiling. If they do not do so, it is likely that they themselves face high 
effective interest rates, or restrictive credit policies. 
  There is a different pattern in the response of M3-H to agricultural as compared to non-
agricultural variables. Structuralist positions, that the relation between the two sectors is important 
for a developing economy, are therefore validated.  
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3.1 The Results 
 Let us systematically examine the results.   
1. The response of M3-H to quantity variables is less than that to price variables. On balance the 
correlations are positive with both GDPA and GDPNA. They are negative in some quarters. The 
positive coefficient for GDPNA reflects the rise in the demand for credit as incomes rise. In the 
yearly regression the coefficient of GDPA is negative. This reflects a fall in the demand for credit for 
stocking food grains in a year with a good harvest. 
2. M3-H rises with WPIF. Banks accommodate the demand for credit for holding food stocks, from 
private and public agencies. 
3. The innovation correlations of M3-H with WPIM are positive but less than those for WPIF. The 
coefficients in the quarterly regressions are positive but that in the yearly regression is negative (and 
significant at the ten percent level). This indicates a tightening in RBI monetary policy responding to 
a rise in manufacturing prices. A sequence consistent with the correlations is: an adverse agricultural 
shock is accommodated by a rise in money supply, but as the shock spreads to industry and 
stagflation occurs the demand for credit falls, with some help from tight money policies.  
4. There has been a heated debate in India on the agricultural terms of trade. In order to comment on 
this, and to further elucidate the hypothesis made in 3, we compute innovation correlations for 
RFMWPI. That is, the ratio of the wholesale prices of food to those of manufacturing. The 
correlations with M3-H are positive but low. Two conclusions arise. First, the two prices move 
together. Otherwise the variation in relative prices would be closer to that of the nominal prices. 
Even if monetary policy targets manufacturing prices, it is not able to cause a large deviation in the 
equilibrium relation between the two prices. Second, the periods when RFMWPI is rising are 
periods of moderate expansion in M3-H, lower than those of the individual price variables. These 
observations are consistent if a sharp inflation in food prices, causes manufacturing prices to rise 
even more. That is, in periods of high industrial growth, mark-ups fall and productivity rises, so that 
the relative terms of trade are turning in favor of agriculture. Nominal agricultural prices would then 
be growing below trend. At the same time speculative demand for credit could be low as there would 
be no positive bubbles in financial asset prices, with physical investment being the more attractive 
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option. The expansion in M3-H would then be moderate. These are the predictions of the models 
developed in Goyal (1994, 1995). 
5. The positive correlation of M3-H is highest with BSEI, positive for the first three quarters, and 
positive in the quarterly regression (II), reflecting strong accommodation of demand arising from 
booming stock markets. 
6. The quarterly regression coefficients are all positive. So are the sums of the correlations for the 
four quarters. Some of the coefficients of the long-run regression are negative, however. The 
dominant negative coefficients in the cointegrating regression, show that the change in M3-H is 
decelerating, so that a stable long-run relationship exists between the variables. 
7. The regression coefficients satisfy expected values for a money supply function. Significant 
correlation coefficients are lower for the past indicating that on balance it is M3-H that responds to 
other variables. Granger causality tests also support such a conclusion (Appendix). For the true 
causality structure all the significant variables must be included, but in bivariate regressions (not 
reported) of the innovations of each of the variables on lagged values of themselves and M3-H, the 
only variable innovations that M3-H did influence were GDPNA and BSEI. The conclusion follows 
that bank credit does impact on real sector performance and on speculative cycles.  
8. Banks have been able to expand credit in line with profitability, even in a controlled regime. But 
profitability seems to have risen most with speculative demand fuelled by asset prices. Rise in bank 
credit in response to output growth or fall in real interest rates (rise in WPIM) has been moderate. 
Controls and selective credit policies, seem to have successfully targeted inflation in manufacturing 
prices. Credit expansion has more flexibly responded to agricultural price inflation -- partly because 
government food procuring and stocking agencies generate a large demand for credit.  
  Mechanisms for the control of the money supply have not been effective in preventing an 
expansion of credit in response to speculative demand. The high coefficients of some price variables 
demonstrate this. There is a very high positive correlation of M3-H with BSEI and CMR; and a 
positive correlation with WPIF. When the profitability of lending becomes very high controls 
become ineffective. The positive coefficient for the CMR indicates that rather than reflecting the 
cost of borrowing for banks, it reflects high earning opportunities. It may be capturing the effect of 
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other interest rates the data for which is not available. The money market is stable, because the 
positive coefficient for CMR is small in the correlations, insignificant in the quarterly regressions, 
and does has a negative value in many quarters. The qualification that the CMR has been on its 
ceiling since 1985, should be kept in mind in interpreting these results.  
 The small response of M3-H to nominal output variables, indicates successful post-facto 
nominal income targeting by the RBI. Monetary control has been strong enough to prevent 
inflationary expectations from really setting in. Even so, the short-run and sectoral effects of 
monetary policy have been less than satisfactory. Restraints on money growth seem to bite in 
periods of industrial stagflation and perhaps deepen the latter4. The systematic pattern of the 
coefficients suggests that more satisfactory short-run monetary policy targeting rules can be 
developed. There is an efficiency gain to be had by taking account of the structure of the Indian 
economy. 
3.2 Interpreting History 
We illustrate the formal argument by referring to  monetary/fiscal responses to specific shocks. Can 
our model help to interpret history? The drought and terms of trade shocks over 1965-67, led to a 
fiscal tightening, with a cut in budget deficits and public investment. Monetary policy was non-
accommodating but not severe. Fiscal and monetary policy were closely linked, as the budget deficit 
was automatically financed. The oil price plus agricultural supply shock over 1973-75 lead to a 
similar response. In both cases there was an unnecessary loss of output. A greater reliance should 
have been placed on food supply policies. The lesson was learnt by the 1979-80 crisis. There was no 
cut in public investment, no long-term adverse effects on output, and a rapid recovery. Monetary 
policy seems to have a delayed response. Money supply was decreased only in mid 1979 and in mid 
1973, with specially severe measures undertaken in 1974. In both cases inflation was well under 
way. The policy measures were jerky because of the reliance on quantitative controls. They were 
successful, however, in preventing the build up of inflationary expectations. Our empirical analysis 
is picking up both this delayed response and the overall control. Although there was a steady rise in 
the fiscal deficit from the mid-seventies, the rise in money supply was much lower, testifying to 
successful control. This was helped by the long-term fall in the velocity of broad money as financial 
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deepening took place (see Joshi and Little 1994).  
 The lessons of history were forgotten in the nineties. The response to the balance of 
payments crisis included a cut in public investment, an artificial agricultural supply shock as 
procurement prices for food grains were raised, and a monetary tightening to sterilize capital 
inflows. The structural reforms were necessary, but their macroeconomic counterparts made it more 
difficult for them to succeed. It is sometimes argued that while short-run sharp inflation in India is 
caused by supply shocks, a rising trend rate of inflation is due to fiscal and monetary laxness. The 
revenue deficit does need to be decreased but our analysis suggests that short-term monetary shocks 
may be worsening stagflation, and leading to secular low growth and high inflation.   
 Our data period covers the imposition of a ban on indigenous liquidity generating 
mechanisms such as badla5 and repurchase options by banks. The ban was imposed after the stock 
market scam in 1992, because the scam although based on insider trading, included misuse of 
repurchase options. In 1995 bridge loans from banks to finance corporations were also banned.  A 
severe credit crunch followed, with nominal interest rates on gilts rising as high as 14 percent. 
Capital inflows, large by Indian standards, started in 1994, but were largely sterilized. Purchase of 
rupees to prevent a threatened depreciation of the rupee in 1995 further squeezed liquidity. Real loan 
rates of interest rose above 22% and were partly responsible for a slowdown in industrial growth. 
Even as liquidity rose credit to industry did not rise because demand was low and new regulations 
made lending to industry more risky. Again monetary policy was targeting industrial inflation and 
damaging output growth.    
 In the seventies the RBI had relied on credit controls on banks, but found these ineffective 
because banks managed to take advantage of loopholes in the definition of deposits or credit, to use 
cash credit, and mobilize non-deposit resources. With the acceptance of the money multiplier 
approach, the RBI then moved towards closer monitoring of reserve requirements. But these are also 
blunt instruments. Controls either do damage by preventing flexible adjustment to shocks, or just 
serve to stimulate ingenuity in discovering loopholes. Self-enforcing mechanisms that enhance 
market incentives to direct credit in desirable directions are preferable. Examples are raising the 
attractiveness of physical investment and imposing taxes on short-term capital gains to curb 
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speculative lending. Prudential norms and computerized transactions can prevent a repetition in the 
misuse of repurchase options. Endogenous liquidity generation allows money markets to function 
smoothly and should not, and in the long-run, cannot be destroyed. Attempts to do so are 
inconsistent with the stated policy objectives of deepening money markets and moving towards open 
market operations as the method of monetary control. But more flexibility needs to be combined 
with policies that raise returns to productive as compared to speculative loans. 
 Base money was endogenized by the automatic financing of the budget deficit but the link 
will be weakened by the financial reforms started in 1991. First limits were set on ad hoc treasury 
bills. In 1997 they were abolished, and temporary shortfalls in liquidity with the government were to 
be met by negotiable ways and means advances, thus granting more autonomy to the RBI.  
Yet the endogeneity of base money is likely to increase, as the economy becomes more open. With 
an exchange rate managed to maintain export competitiveness, monetary policy becomes  less 
effective, and interest rates have to be linked to world rates.   
 Banks have demonstrated their ability to circumvent controls to satisfy the profit motive. 
Financial reforms will enhance this ability, but it can be constructive if these incentives push banks 
in desirable directions. This can happen if it is profits from lending to industry that rise. 
Interventions can be fine tuned as the Reserve Bank moves from the blunt instrument of compulsory 
reserve requirement to open market operations, but knowledge of the structure of past responses 
should be used to improve targeting and attainment of the ultimate objectives of low inflation and 
high growth. Monetary tightening should not coincide with a rise in manufacturing prices. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Indian bank credit is shown to have responded to demand for speculative credit. Responses to food 
and non-food price and output are dissimilar. Monetary policy has succeeded in preventing 
explosive growth in money supply but it has targeted non-food prices. It would be more efficient to 
target agricultural prices for inflation control. The overall rate of growth of the monetary base was 
adequate, but its timing can be improved if a contraction of base money is completed earlier than it 
has been in the past, and coincides with a rise in food prices. Details of such a targeting rule can 
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easily be worked out. Information available in the systematic structural features of the Indian 
economy can be exploited in designing monetary policy. 
 Whenever incentives to expand credit were high enough banks found ways around a variety 
of quantitative controls. Price bubbles in assets that lead to expansions in broad money, can better be 
controlled through a combination of the carrot and the stick, working through the market. The carrot 
could be raising incentives for productive investment; the stick, taxes and regulation. 
 Credit turns out to be the endogenous outcome of incentives facing agents. But in our data 
set, as interest rates were imperfectly flexible, these incentives were carried by a range of price 
variables. There was also evidence that Reserve Bank monetary control had intensified shocks to 
real output, while being unable to prevent the expansion of credit in response to a speculative profit 
motive. 
 
Appendix 
"Microfit 386" was used to test for the order of integration. Next, ARIMA processes were identified 
by applying the law of parsimony to the significant ARIMA equations. In the case of choice between 
AR and MA process, the latter was chosen. The model does not have a good fit for GDPA, as the Q 
statistic is not satisfactory. The results are given below: 
 
Variables                 ARIMA processes 
    (AR I MA)  
M3-H    (1  2  0) 
GDPA    (1  0  0) 
GDPNA   (3  1  0) 
WPIF    (1  1  0) 
WPIM    (0  1  1) 
CMR    (1  1  1) 
BSEI    (0  1  1) 
RFMWPI   (0  1  1) 
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PLACE TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 4 gives the diagnostic tests for the order of integration. The estimated equations follow. The 
difference operator is d. 
dd(M3-H)  = - 0.72937 dd(M3 - H)(-1) 
GDPA   = - 0.07879 GDPA(-1)  
dDGDPNA  = - 0.92015 dGDPNA(-1) - 0.66114 dGDPNA(-2)  
           - 0.71032 dGDPNA(-3) 
dWPIF  = - 0.081596 dWPIF(-1)  
dWPIM  = - 0.47701 e(-1) 
dCMR   = - 0.51574 dCMR(-1) + 0.35550 e(-1) 
dBSEI   =  0.29801 e(-1) 
dRFMWPI  = 0.32155 e(-1) 
The identified ARIMA processes were estimated for each variable and the residuals obtained. The 
residuals are called innovations. In the last step we calculated the correlations at lags +3 to -3 
between the various innovations and the innovations in M3-H.  
  Since these innovations are stationary series, we can use them to determine the direction of 
Granger causality. The idea of Granger causality is simple. It develops the statistical implications of 
the fact that the future cannot cause the past. In the case of two stationary variables X and M3-H, 
consider the regression of X on a number of lags of itself and on a number of lags of M3-H. These 
variables are stationary because they are innovations of our variables, where X is a vector referring 
to all our exogenous variables. If the lagged values of M3-H are not statistically significant in 
explaining X, the null hypothesis that M3-H does not cause X could not be rejected. But a 
cautionary note is in order: instantaneous causality only describes a non zero correlation between the 
joint distributions of two sets of random variables. A Granger causality analysis only indicates that a 
set of variables contains useful information for improving the predictions of another set of variables. 
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 To test the causality we first regress innovations in M3-H on lags of itself and on all the 
lagged variables (Table 5). The lag length chosen is two. No lag was statistically significant beyond 
two. This establishes that innovations in our variables do contain useful information to improve the 
predictions of M3-H. In particular, innovations WPIM, CMR and BSEI cause innovations in M3-H. 
 PLACE TABLE 5 HERE 
 
 To determine whether innovations in M3-H cause innovations in other variables, we 
examine the VAR representation of the system. We partition the variables in two blocks, one 
contains only innovations in M3-H and other innovations in all other variables. We found that 
coefficients of innovations in M3-H in all the equations are statistically insignificant: innovations in 
M3-H do not cause innovations in all other variables. The coefficients for M3-H were all zeros, 
except for -0.002 in the equation with WPIF as the dependent variable.  
 Next we turn to the long-run relationship among the variables. The long-run relationship 
between a number of series can be looked at from the viewpoint of cointegration. Let xt be a vector 
of 5 component time series. In our analysis  
 xt = f( D(M3-H), GDPNA, WPIF, WPIM, BSEI ) 
are each integrated of order one. Then xt is said to be cointegrated if there exists a vector such that 
 st = a'xt
is I(0). Stationarity of st implies that the n-variables do not drift away from one another over the 
long-run, thus obeying an equilibrium relationship. The Engle and Granger (1987) approach can deal 
with the possibility of one linear combination of variables that is stationary, but in practice, when 
there are more than two variables in a multivariate setting, more than one stable linear combination 
can exist. The more cointegrating vectors there are, the more stable the system. Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) have developed a maximum likelihood testing procedure on a number of 
cointegrating vectors. 
 Statistical tests giving the evidence for the number of cointegrating vectors using the 
variables specified in the xt vector are reported in Table 4. The statistics confirm the rejection of no 
cointegrating in favor of one cointegrating vector at the 90% confidence level. Both the trace and 
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maximum eigenvalue tests suggest the acceptance of the hypothesis of one cointegrating vector. 
There was a ceiling on the CMR for much of the period, and it was not very significant in the 
regressions, so it has not been used in the cointegration analysis.  
 PLACE TABLE 6 HERE 
 We tested the significance of the coefficients of the cointegrating vector found by 
consecutively putting each of the coefficients equal to zero and keeping all other coefficients the 
same. The Chi-Square statistics are: 
Variable  Chi-Square Values  
GDPNA   14.6765 (.005) 
WPIF   22.2373 (.000) 
WPIM   22.0116 (.000) 
BSEI   22.2818 (.000) 
The bracketed values are the probability that the critical values are greater than the reported values. 
All of our co-efficients are significant.  
 
Data Sources 
M3, H, CMR, and gold prices were collected from the Report on Currency and Finance (RBI), 1980-
81 through 1992-93; WPIF, WPIM from RBI Bulletins; annual data on GDP agriculture and GDP 
non agriculture from the Economic Survey 1992-93. An RBI mimeo on Quarterly estimates of GDP: 
1970-71 to 1990-91 (R. K. Das) provided quarterly data on output variables. This paper gives the 
series up to 1990-91. For the period after that the series were extrapolated keeping the share of 
different quarters constant. Data on BSEI were collected from the Bombay Stock Exchange. 
  
Footnotes 
1.  A more recent macromodel that can be classified as structuralist is Krishnamurthy and 
Pandit (1985). Ahluwalia (1979), and Rangarajan and Arif (1990) are in a more monetarist 
vein. 
 
2.  See the results reported in the Chakravarty Committee Report (RBI 1985). At his 
convocation address at IGIDR in 1995 the then RBI Governor, Rangarajan, reiterated this 
view. 
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3.  GDPA and GDPNA are measured in current prices. 
 
4.  Returns to an asset rise with its price, provided real returns are not affected. But, from the 
Fisher equation, if the nominal rate of interest is fixed, the real rate of interest will fall with 
expected inflation. 
 
5.  Joshi and Little (1994) argue that in the presence of significant short-run variability in 
money demand and the money multiplier, and information and implementation lags, Indian 
monetary policy has been overactive in response to exogenous shocks. We make a slightly 
different point. Information available in the systematic structural features of the Indian 
economy has not been exploited in designing monetary policy. 
 
6. Badla is an indigenous system that was used to carry settlements in the share markets over to 
the next period. 
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Table 1: Qualitative Results of Regressions with M3-H as the Dependent Variable. 
      
Variables: Yearly            Quarterly Correlation Quarterly  
               (I)      (II)   
CONS  -            -ve  -  -ve (insig) 
GP  +ve (insig)      - -  - 
CMR  +ve  +ve (insig) -ve  +ve (insig) 
GDPA             -ve  +ve (insig) -ve  +ve (insig) 
GDPNA +ve  +ve  +ve  +ve 
WPIF  +ve  +ve  -ve   - 
WPIM             -ve (insig) +ve  -ve     - 
BSEI  -  -ve (insig) +ve  +ve 
RFMWPI -  -  +ve   +ve 
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Table 2: Quantitative Results of Regressions with M3-H as the Dependent Variable. 
     
Variables: Yearly  Quarterly  Quarterly 
        (I)   (II)   
CONS        -  -2.192 (-3.42)  -1.887 (-1.48) 
GP    .196 (0.84)        -         - 
CMR   1.240 (4.75)   .033  (0.86)    .018 ( 0.24) 
GDPA            -1.994 (-3.89)   .031  (1.55)    .028 ( 0.70) 
GDPNA  2.072 (3.73)   .087  (4.92)   1.021 ( 7.31) 
WPIF   2.368 (2.89)   .792  (5.07)             - 
WPIM            -1.532 (-1.41)  1.016  (5.70)        -     
BSEI        -    -.024  (0.55)     .405 ( 8.84) 
RFMWPI       -           -    .165 ( 0.56)  
  R2 (adjusted) R2 (adjusted)  R2 (adjusted)  
     .990     .989      .960   
 
*Figures in the bracket are t-ratios      
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Table 3: Comovement in (M3-H) and Nominal Variables: Correlations Between Innovations 
from ARIMA Processes. 
      Innovation in (M3-H) at time:           
Innovations  
at time 0 in: 
  -3   -2         -1             0    +1       +2      +3 
GDPA            .119   -.203          .096  -.040      .161        -.216       .150  
             (0.81)   (-1.42)        (0.66) (-0.27)    (1.12)      (-1.51)    (1.03) 
GDPNA  .043   .074            -.251  .260       .014        -.317       .216 
  (0.28)   (0.49)         (-1.74)     (1.83)     (0.09)      (-2.22)    (1.45) 
WPIF              -.047    -.012           .134    -.026       .020         .076       .215 
  (-0.32)   (-0.08)        (0.93)   (-0.18)    (0.14)      (0.52)    (1.48) 
WPIM             -.080    .141            -.027     -.097      .158         .202     -.009  
  (-0.54)   (0.98) (-0.19)    (-0.67)    (1.10)      (1.41)    (-0.06) 
CMR    .334    .045   -.121    .325         -.052 -.133     -.006 
  (2.38)     (0.31) (-0.84)    (2.36)      (-0.36)     (-0.91)    (-0.04)  
BSEI   -.031     -.317    .127     .363          .008 .044     -.005 
  (-0.21)    (-2.29) (0.88)     (2.67)      (0.05) (0.30)    (-0.03) 
RFMWPI   .039     .001    .010  .016            -.035   -.081       .231 
  (0.26)     (0.006) (0.07) (0.11)         (-0.24)      (-0.56)   (1.61) 
 
The values in brackets are t statistics, the formula used for calculating these is: 
tn-2 = r(n-2)0.5 / (1-r2)0.5
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Table: 4 Calculated Values of T(b-1) for the Dickey-Fuller Test Based on Estimated OLS 
Autoregressive Coefficient  
Name of Variable Level First Difference Second Difference Degree of 
Integration 
M3-H     2.16 -10.85   -84.73   I(2) 
GDPA             -74.02       I(0) 
GDPNA    0.43 -50.57      I(1) 
WPIF    -8.76 -54.03      I(1) 
WPIM                1.05 -54.03      I(1) 
CMR    -3.09 -84.15      I(1) 
BSEI   -10.36 -69.24      I(1) 
RFMWPI  -14.92* -65.65                   I(1)  
 
The critical values are -12.9 except for the * superscript. In this case, it is 19.8. The critical values 
are taken from Table B.5 of Hamilton. 
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Table 5: Results from Causality Test 
Name of the Variables Estimated Coefficients T-Statistics 
Constant 46.74 0.28 
LM3-H -0.06 -0.41 
LLM3-H -0.67* -5.40 
LGDPA -0.01 -0.75 
LLGDPA -0.002 -0.14 
LGDPNA -0.08 -0.60 
LLGDPNA 0.17 1.28 
LWPIF -32.94 -1.30 
LLWPIF 2.01 0.08 
LWPIM 64.20* 2.13 
LLWPM -21.56 -0.58 
LCMR -234.33* -2.22 
LLCMR 252.43* 2.35 
LBSEI 4.07* 3.21 
LLBSEI -20.11** -1.89 
 
Note: The figure with * is strongly significant and with ** are weakly significant.  
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Table 6: Critical Values for Tests of the Number of Cointegrating Vectors 
Null Alternative LMAX            Critical          LTRACE  Critical 
     Value                 Value 
     (90%)        (90%) 
 r=0 r=1  32.82  30.90  70.72   64.84 
r<=1 r=2  17.79  24.73  37.90   43.95 
r<=2 r=3  12.12  18.60  20.11   26.78 
r<=3 r=4   7.99  12.07    7.99   13.32 
r<=4 r=5    .00    2.69      .00     2.69   
   
